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Abstract: A European Army featured at the very beginning of the European 
integration process. In the early 1950s the ‘Plan Pléven’ proposed to establish a 
European Defence Community comprising inter alia of an integrated European 
Defence Force. However, the plan failed and the notion of a European army 
disappeared from the European agenda for a long time. While the creation of a 
European army is controversial and not very likely in the short term, the (Common) 
European Security and Defence Policy developed since the late 1990s might well lead 
to a permanent European military force in the medium or long term. However, so far 
EU military missions (in Bosnia, the DRC, Mali, or the Horn of Africa), while based 
on a permanent intergovernmental framework and EU military bodies, have been 
conducted by forces made up of national Member State forces formed on an ad hoc 
basis. The paper will examine the legal and policy arguments for a European army 
and discuss how the existing legal framework under the Treaty of Lisbon would need 
to be reformed to permit the establishment of such an entity. 
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Many readers will find the title and topic of this article quite provocative as the 
subject matter of a European army is controversial. First, it is controversial for many 
who are opposed to war and the military: they are not only against a European army, 
but against armies in general. This is understandable. However, it is hoped that what a 
European Army would be used for, that is for peacekeeping and State building rather 
than for invasions, can put some of those critical about the military at ease. Moreover, 
it needs to be remembered that European integration is always first of all about peace. 
Second, a European Army is of course controversial for those opposed to transferring 
any further powers to the European Union (EU). Moreover, the creation of common 
European military structures would entail the transfer to powers in the area of security 
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and defence policy which are perceived to be at the very heart of national sovereignty. 
If the competence for defence is handed over to Brussels, they might say, the EU 
finally becomes a State and the United Kingdom and the other Member States would 
loose their independence.1 However, it is submitted that such fears are exaggerated 
and hopefully the financial, military, and political arguments for common structures 
outlined below will be carefully considered.  
This article aims to address three basic questions: (1) what is to be understood 
under the term “European Army”?, (2) why should a European Army be established?, 
and finally (3) how could a European Army be established? The article will therefore 
have the following structure: it will begin by laying the foundations for the 
understanding of the main thesis of the paper. First, the significance of defence in the 
European integration process will be outlined. Second, three models of a European 
Army as reflected in existing legal and policy documents will be discussed. It will 
then move on to the main part of the argument. This will explain first ‘the why?’ and 
second ‘the how?’ of a European army based on legal concepts. In other words, it will 
discuss a legal argument for the establishment of a European army, an argument based 
on the principle of subsidiarity, and the legal concept or technique through which a 




2. European integration and defence 
Defence - and even a European army - featured prominently at the very beginning of 
the European integration process. As early as 1950, in the Assembly of the Council of 
Europe, Sir Winston Churchill called for:  
 
“[…] the immediate creation of a unified European army […] under a unified 
command, and which we should all bear a worthy and honourable part […]”2    
 
While this probably makes Winston Churchill the “father” or the modern idea of a 
European army, the concrete proposal was a French idea.  
 
 
                                                
*Director, Institute of European Law, Birmingham Law School, University of Birmingham 
This article is an edited version of the inaugural lecture of the author as Professor of European Law and 
Policy at the University of Birmingham on 3 November 2009. Footnotes were added in September 
2010 and the paper edited again in July 2015. The 2015 version of the paper was also delivered at the 
45the UACES conference in Bilbao in September 2015 and published at: 
http://www.uaces.org/documents/papers/1501/trybus.pdf and also in 2015 on SSRN at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2675017  
1 See for example Mr Geoffrey Van Orden MEP, the Conservative European defence 
spokesman on the plan to establish “Synchronized Armed Forces Europe: "[British ministers] are 
sleepwalking towards a European army and seem to have little awareness of what is going on”, 18 
February 2009, telegraph.co.uk; Conservative defence spokesman Liam Fox MP: “The idea of a 
standing European military force under EU command or the creation of an EU defence budget is 
wishful but dangerous thinking. […] This is another example of the EU getting involved in an area in 
which it has no business”, 7 June 2008, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1024630/France-
plotting-create-Euro-Army.html#ixzz0gdAxFdU7; and “But the development of a European Army 
would undermine Nato, creating two parallel military bureaucracies that would not only cost a fortune - 
much of it, as usual, from the UK taxpayer - but compete directly with each other. 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1024803/Folly-wreck-Nato.html#ixzz0gdBmhPgp 
2 Council of Europe, Consultative Assembly, Ordinary Session 1950, Documents. 
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2.1 The European Defence Community 
In 1952, following the establishment of the very first European Community, the 
European Community for Coal and Steel, the Plan Pléven envisaged a European 
Defence Community between six Member States: France, Italy, Germany, Belgium, 
the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The European Defence Community Treaty3 
envisaged nothing less than the merger of the armed forces of the Member States into 
a single European army called the “European Defence Forces”.4 These forces were to 
be organised and supervised by a supranational (meaning independent) administration 
answerable to a European Assembly and reviewed by a Court of Justice.5 Units from 
the Member States were to be made available to the Community “with a view of their 
fusion” into the European Defence Forces. These were to be made up of conscripts 
and regular volunteers wearing a common (blue) uniform.6 No Member State could 
have recruited or maintained national armed forces.7 Hence the European Defence 
Force was to replace the armed forces of the Member States. Having been signed by 
all six Member States and ratified by four, in the end the French Parliament voted 
against ratification in 1954.8 After the failure of the European Defence Community, 
defence dropped completely off the European agenda for decades. The defence of 
Europe became the exclusive task of the Northern Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO). In their 2003 book Toward a European Army the political scientists Trevor 
Salmon and Alistair Shepherd therefore rightly called the second half of the 20th 
century “fifty years of failure”.9 
 
 
2.2 The Common Foreign and Security Policy 
38 years later, in 1992, in the first Maastricht version of the Treaty on European 
Union, the new Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was created. This put 
security, but not yet defence, back on the European agenda, as an intergovernmental 
                                                
3 La Traité Instituant la Communauté Européene de Défense – La Documentation Française 
was originally published by the Ministère des Affaires Etrangères in Paris [undated 1952?]. There are 
two English translations. One was presented to the United Kingdom Parliament in April 1954 as The 
European Defence Community Treaty Paris, May 27, 1952 (together with related documents), Cmd 
9127 (London: HMSO, 1954). The Office of the United States Special Representative in Europe 
published a separate and slightly different unofficial translation of the EDC Treaty on 26 January 1953 
based on the United States Senate publication 94118 (82nd Congress 2nd session), a NATO version 
published on 12 July 1952 and on translation of one of the agreements by the Allied High 
Commission’s Secretariat. Article 1 EDC Treaty: 
“The High Contracting Parties, by the present Treaty, set up among themselves a European Defence 
Community, supra-national in character, comprising common institutions, common Armed Forces, and 
a common budget.”        
4 European Defence Community Treaty 1952 Part III: Military Provisions; Chapter I: 
Organisation and Administration of the European Defence Forces (Articles 68-79), Chapter II: Status 
of the European Defence Forces.           
5 European Defence Community Treaty 1952 Part II: The Institutions of the Community, 
Chapter I: The Board of Commissioners (Articles 19-32); Chapter II: The Assembly (Articles 33-38), 
Chapter III: The Council (Articles 39-50), Chapter IV: The Court (Articles 51-67). 
6 Article 15 EDC Treaty, According to Article 12 of the Military Protocol to the EDC 
conscription would last at least 18 months. 
7 Except in clearly defined circumstances: Article 9 subparagraph 2 EDC. 
8 For more detailed accounts of this failure including the reasons: Edward Fursdon, The 
European Defence Community: A History (Macmillan: London, 1980), chapter 7: “Prelude to failure”, 
at 227-265 and chapter 8: “La ronde est complète”, at 266-299 and Daniel Lerner and Raymond Aron, 
France Defeats EDC (Frederick A. Praeger: NewYork, 1957). 
9 Trevor C. Salmon and Alistair J. K. Sheperd, Toward a European Army: A Military Power 
in the Making? (Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder and London, 2003), chapter 2 at 15. 
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framework, meaning that it was controlled by the Member States who retained a veto 
right on all decisions.10 On defence the new Treaty said in its Article 17 (1): 
 
“The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating 
to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common 
defence policy, which might lead to a common defence, should the European 
Council so decide.” 
 
This means that a common defence – which could and it is submitted would entail a 
common European army – is recognised as a possible future step.11 The Treaty of 
Lisbon contains a very similar provision in Article 42 (2).12 However, a common 
defence was of course not established with the Maastricht Treaty. That common 
defence is, as the author wrote in his book European Union Law and Defence 
Integration “vague, uncertain and set in the future”.13 
 
 
2.3 The European Security and Defence Policy 
It was not before the Treaty of Nice in 2000 that more flesh was put to the bone, with 
a new European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as part of the CFSP just 
mentioned.14 At the same time the so called ‘Petersberg Tasks’, essentially outlining 
the objectives for a common European Security and Defence Policy were inserted into 
the Treaty. They were listed in Article 17 (2) TEU: “humanitarian and rescue tasks, 
peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including 
peacemaking”. The Treaty of Lisbon contains a very similar provision in Article 43 
(1).15 This defines what Marc Leonard, in his book Why Europe will run the 21st 
Century calls “the European way of war”.16 Essentially for the EU the military is only 
                                                
10 On the differences between the envisaged supranational European Defence Community and 
the intergovernmental Common Foreign and Security Policy see: M. Trybus, “The Vision of the 
European Defence Community and a Common Defence for the European Union” in M. Trybus and N. 
D. White (eds.), European Security Law (OUP, 2007), chapter 2 at 13.  
11 Martin Trybus, European Union Law and Defence Integration (Hart: Oxford, 2005) at 64 -
65. 
12 Article 42 (2) Treaty on European Union (Lisbon) reads:  
“The [CFSP] shall include the progressive framing of a common defence policy. This will lead to a 
common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides. It shall in that case 
recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective 
constitutional requirements. 
The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the 
security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain 
Member States, which see their common defence realised in [NATO], under the North Atlantic Treaty 
and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework.” 
13 Trybus, European Union Law and Defence Integration, supra note 11, at 61. 
14 See in general on the ESDP: R. A. Wessel, “The State of Affairs in European Security and 
Defence Policy: The Breakthrough in the Treaty of Nice” (2003) 8 Journal of Conflict & Security Law 
265-288.  
15 Article 43 (1) TEU (Lisbon) reads:  
“The tasks referred to in Article 42 (1), in the course of which the Union may use civilian and military 
means, shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and 
assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis 
management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation.  
All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in 
combating terrorism in their territories.” 
16 Marc Leonard, Why Europe will run the 21st Century (Fourth Estate: London and New 
York, 2005), chapter 5 and 57. 
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part of a whole framework of instruments – together with police, lawyers, consultants, 
teachers, doctors, etc. – of peacekeeping (and when necessary peacemaking), crisis 
management, State building, and rescue. In contrast, the “American way of war” is 
more based on the military, a contrast which the US American Robert Kagan in his 
book Of Paradise and Power described as Americans being from Mars and Europeans 
being from Venus.17 Interestingly, however, the new US administration is about to 
add the “EU’s Venus approach” to the “American war of war” by creating a 4,000 
strong civil crisis reaction force by the end of 2010.18  
The ESDP had been a British initiative. During the Franco-British summit of 
Saint-Malo in December 1998 the President of France and the Prime Minister of the 
United Kingdom agreed on a Joint Declaration on European Defence.19 The 
declaration referred directly to the CFSP. In order for the EU “to be in a position to 
play its full role on the international stage”, so Chirac and Blair:  
 
“[…] the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by 
credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do 
so, in order to respond to international crises”.20  
 
Why did the United Kingdom change its traditionally reserved position on a common 
defence? Ultimately this was triggered by the results of a Ministry of 1998 Defence 
Strategic Review ordered by the Prime Minister. As summarised by Sandholtz and 
Sweet, the review concluded what is still the case today:   
 
“ […] in an emergency situation the EU Member States could only mobilise a 
very limited force, heavily dependent on the support of the USA regarding 
transportation, logistics, and communications. Europe simply lacks the skills 
and equipment for independent military action: although the EU Member 
States spend about two-thirds of what the USA spend on defence, they can 
only deploy about 10 per cent of what the USA can deploy.”21  
 
Therefore the perceived necessity of the modernisation of the armed forces to equip 
them for new tasks is an important motive of the initiative. This modernisation will be 
expensive, too expensive for a purely national effort. The British Prime Minister 
understood that the relevant modern armed forces of the future, capable and equipped 
to be deployed worldwide without the help of the USA, are too expensive for any 
single Member State of the EU. The only alternative to a national military dependent 
on the USA is a European force.22  
                                                
17 Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order 
(Alfred A. Knopf: New York, 2003), at 3. 
18 John Herbst, Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilisation, S Department of State during 
a conference “Building a Strategic US-EU Partnership on Defence and Security Aspects” organised by 
the Atlantic Council in partnership with the Center for Transatlantic Relations and the Centre for 
Strategic and International Studies as part of the Project on Forging a Strategic US-EU Partnership, 
Washington DC, 21 October 2009. 
19 Franco-British Summit, “Joint Declaration on European Defence: Saint-Malo”, 3-4 
December 1998, in: From St-Malo to Nice, European Defence: core documents, compiled by Maartje 
Rutten, Chaillot Paper 47, Institute of Security Studies of the Western European Union, Paris, 2001, at 
8. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Wayne Sandholtz and Alex Stone Sweet (eds.), European Integration and National 
Governance (OUP 1998), at 259. 
22 Reference to Anglo-French Treaty. 
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Saint-Malo “triggered” a number of corresponding decisions of the EU. The 
Cologne European Councils of June 199923 and Helsinki of December 1999 
‘Europeanised’ the Franco-British Saint-Malo initiative. Helsinki stipulated the more 
tangible ‘Helsinki Headline Goal’. This entails the current vision of common military 
structures. First, the EU was to be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and to 
sustain for at least one year, military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons or up to 
15 brigades, capable of the full range of the ‘Petersberg tasks’ – “the European way of 
war”. The forces were to be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, 
control and intelligence capabilities, logistics and other combat support services and 
additionally, as appropriate air and navel elements. The French Presidency Report at 
the European Council at Nice speaks of a “pool of 100,000 persons, […] 400 combat 
aircraft and 100 vessels.” The Helsinki Presidency Conclusions also stated:  
 
“The European Council underlines its determination to develop an 
autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not 
engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to 
international crises. This process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does 
not imply the creation of a European army."24 
 
It is necessary to point this out in the second part of the last sentence of this citation, 
because what is proposed appears to be exactly that: a European army. 
The European Rapid Reaction Force envisaged in St-Malo and Helsinki was 
not established by 2003 as planned and was never been established as such. In 2005 
the ‘battle group concept’ was developed and established in subsequent European 
Councils. It means that Member States earmark ‘on call’ battle groups of 1,500 men 
and women with the respective equipment. 15 of these groups have been established 
so far. They have never been called to action.  
Another important development occurred since the beginning of the century. 
The ESDP was increasingly put into action. This started with a small police force in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, continued with a first military peacekeeping force in the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, another force in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo and culminated in the at times 7,000 strong EUFOR peacekeeping force 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina to replace the UN force in place before that. Since then the 
EU carried out over 20 missions, using the military, police, and other law enforcement 
units for peacekeeping and law enforcement in various parts of Europe, Africa, and 
the Middle East.25 What needs to be said is that the EU missions so far have been 
                                                
23 Declaration of the European Council on Strengthening the Common European Policy on 
Security and Defence, European Council Meeting in Cologne, 3-4 June 1999, Rutten, From Saint Malo 
to Nice, supra note 00, at 42-43. 
24 European Council, Presidency Conclusions: European Council Meeting in Helsinki, 10-11 
December 1999. 
25 A good overview of the missions up to 2007 is provided by F. Naert, “The EU’s ESDP 
Operations” in Trybus and White (eds.), European Security Law, supra note 10. There had been 11 
operations until then: the military operations CONCORDIA in the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (FYROM), ARTEMIS in the Democratic Republic of Congo and ALTHEA in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the police operations EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina, PROXIMA in Macedonia and 
EUPOL KINSHASA in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the rule of law mission EUJUST THEMIS 
in Georgia, the integrated rule of law mission EUJUST LEX for Iraq, the security sector reform 
mission EUSEC DRC in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the mixed civilian-military EU Support to 
AMIS II (African Union (AU) Mission in the Darfur region of Sudan) and the EU AMM monitoring 
mission in Aceh .(Indonesia). Naert also mentions EC/EU missions launched before 1999 which would 
probably be qualified as crisis management operations today, in particular the EU’s administration of 
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mostly small (exception EUFOR Althea in Bosnia), second hand (taking over from 
NATO or the UN), and at the low end of security (when hostilities where mostly over 
and with an emphasis on non-military tasks).26 An intensive and large military 
conflict would be too much for the EU at this stage27 and perhaps it will never get 
there. However, the last decade has seen major moves towards the transformation of 
the EU from not much more than an internal market to also a security actor. While 
this development remains incomplete and many questions remain unanswered, the 
ESDP is taking shape. One of the questions that remain unanswered is what shape an 
EU military force would take. The question is if such a military force will be 
established has already been answered in the affirmative. Whether this force deserves 
the name “European army” remains yet to be seen.     
 
 
3. Models for a ‘European Army’ 
Based on the explanations made so far, three models for a ‘European army’ emerge. 
The first model is that of the ‘European Defence Force’ envisaged in the European 
Defence Community of old, a true ‘European army’ to replace the national armed 
forces of the Member States. This model is currently the least likely in the short or 
medium term as it would involve a major restructuring of all aspects of defence policy 
and would represent a significant transfer of Member State sovereignty to the EU. 
However, it does offer considerable advantages which will be outlined below. Hence 
the ‘European Defence Force model’ should not be entirely dismissed. 
The second model is that of the ‘European Rapid Reaction Force’ envisaged in 
St-Malo and Helsinki, a limited yet sizable common force made up of voluntary 
contributions of the Member States, with common command structures and budgetary 
arrangements. This European Rapid Reaction Force would, however, co-exist with the 
national armed forces of the Member States, gradually making peacekeeping 
exclusive to the European Rapid Reaction Force leaving homeland defence to the 
armed forces of the Member States and NATO. This model is a possibility in the 
medium term but not the short term. 
The third model is that of the ‘EU Battle Group Force’ whereby Member 
States voluntarily earmark specifically prepared battle groups of 1,500 men and 
women and put them at the disposal of the EU. This model is more or less already put 
in place. Member States already agreed on the establishment and could agree on the 
further development and use of this model. However, many of the considerable 
benefits outlined in the main part of the argument put forward I this paper have not 
and will not be realised if this model will continue to be used in the future.      
Hence, depending on what in the understanding of the reader constitutes a 
‘European army’, such an army is either a distant possibility or already becoming a 
reality. It is not impossible that the EU Battle Group concept – which will be 
established in the short term - will develop into a more integrated and permanent 
                                                                                                                                       
the city of Mostar (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and the EC/EU Monitoring Mission (ECMM/EUMM) in 
the former Yugoslavia. In addition, Mr. Solana, the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy and Secretary-General of the Council of the EU (SG/HR), recently mentioned 
plans to transform the EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (COPPS, a core unit of 
EU police/security advisors in the Palestinian territories) into an ESDP mission. See also A. Missiroli, 
“The European Union: Just a Regional Peacekeeper?” (2003) 8 European Foreign Affairs Review 493, 
at 493 (hereinafter ‘Regional Peacekeeper’). […] 
26 Wessel, “State of affairs”, supra note 14, at 283. 
27 This assessment of S. Duke, “Nice’s Overtrumped Success” “(2001) 6 European Foreign 
Affairs Review 155, at 160 still holds true today. 
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European Rapid Reaction Force in the medium term (15 years) and will be further 
developed to a European Defence Force in the long term (25 years?). All this will 
depend on the political will of the Member States, also determined by the financial 
position and the military strategic situation, not least in response to US American 
demands.   
 
 
4. Why a European Army?  
The main argument of this article is that the principle of subsidiarity supports the 
allocation of defence policy to the EU level, including the establishment of European 
military structures.  
What is subsidiarity? Governance, to use a term coined by the political 
scientist Frits Scharf, can occur on different levels. In the context of the United 
Kingdom, it can occur at the level of the central government and parliament in 
Westminster, the devolved governments in Edinburgh, Cardiff, and Belfast, or local 
governments in Birmingham, Stafford, or Lichfield. In the context of the EU it can 
occur at the EU level in Brussels or the national Member State level in Paris, Rome, 
or Westminster. The decision to which level the competence for a policy and decision 
making should be attributed, in a system of multi-level governance, is, as Joseph 
Weiler wrote in his seminal article The Transformation of Europe “the most explosive 
of “federal” battlegrounds”.28 In another article he called the principle of subsidiarity 
“deliciously vague”.29 
However, the essence of the principle of subsidiarity ultimately requires that the 
allocation of a particular competence is to be determined: if in doubt at the lowest 
possible level, but otherwise, at the level at which the policy will be the most 
effective.30 This notion of ‘effectiveness’ of a level should be determined by an 
                                                
28 J. H. H. Weiler, “The Transformation of Europe” originally published in (1991) 100 Yale 
Law Journal 403, here citing from J. H. H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe: “Do the New Clothes 
have an Emperor?” And Other Essays on European Integration (CUP, 1999) chapter 2, 10, at 39      . 
29 J. H. H. Weiler and U. Haltern, “The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order Through 
the Looking Glas” originally published in (1996) 37 Harvard International Law Journal 411, here 
citing from J. H. H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe, ibid., chapter 9,286, at  318. 
30 Article 5 (3) TEU (Lisbon): 
“Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the 
Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but rather, by 
reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.[emphasis 
added]” 
This provision replaces, in substance, Article 5 EC Treaty (Nice). As pointed out in Paul P. Craig and 
Gráinne de Búrca, EU Law (OUP, 4th ed., 2008) at  103, with reference ot the then Article 5 EC Treaty, 
the principle of subsidiarity contains three interrelated elements: “[1] the [then] Community is to take 
action only if the objectives of that action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States; [2] the 
[then] Community can better achieve the action because of its scale and effects; [3] if the [then] 
Community does take action then this should not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the Treaty 
objectives.” The argument of this article is based on the second element. The European Commission as 
initiator of new legislation calls the first two elements outlined above a ‘test of comparative efficiency’, 
see: Commission Communication to the Council and the European Parliament, Bull. EC 10-1992, 116. 
It should be emphasised, however, that the subsidiarity-based argument made in this article, is only 
loosely based on this test of comparative efficiency. The principle of subsdiarity applies only in a (not 
very clearly) defined context, in policy field conferred to the EU but not subject to exclusive EU 
competence. Article 5 TEU does not apply do defence since this is clearly not in any way conferred to 
the EU (yet). Nevertheless, the argument made below is, if the ‘test of comparative efficiency’ of 
subsidiarity was applied to defence and the armed forces, the EU rather than the Member States should 
take action in this area.          
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evaluation. First, at what level do we get the best results? In the context of defence 
and the armed forces this has to be determined by financial considerations, but of 
course also by military-strategic and political considerations. Currently, the 
competence for defence and the armed forces lies firmly with the Member States. As 
a consequence Europe’s 2 million soldiers,31 the USA has only 1.4 million,32 are 
divided between 28 armies, and Europe’s £400 billion a year defence spending, the 
USA spends about £600 million, is divided into 27 separate national budgets. What 
are the financial, military-strategic, and political implications of this attribution of 
competence for defence to the Member States? Second, what would be the 
implications if this competence was conferred to the EU? 
 
 
4.1 Financial considerations  
There is, perhaps not surprisingly, no published data on the costs of a divided defence 
as compared to a common defence. However, the leading British defence economist 
Keith Hartley provides us with two crucial figures. The first is a 17 per cent figure. 
This is a conservative estimate of the cost savings if a single EU armaments agency 
provided a single EU army, navy and air force.33 Hartley writes that: 
 
“This scenario is the most attractive economically but politically the most 
difficult to achieve.”34    
 
The background is the massive duplication of all aspects of the national defence 
efforts (ministries, armies, arms production) simply making them too small and 
failing to achieve the necessary economies of scale. 
This 17 per cent figure only relates to the costs of armaments equipment. There is 
no published data on cost savings in other areas of defence spending, for example on 
                                                
31 2,013,990 according to the EU Institute of Security Studies paper Strength in numbers? 
Comparing EU military capabilities in 2009 with 1999 at: 
http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/PolicyBrief-05.pdf (accessed in September 2010). This figure 
is taken from the paper The Military Balance 2009 published by the International Institute of Strategic 
Studies (IISS). The (EU) European Defence Agency (2009) estimates this figure at 1,800,707: 
http://www.eda.europa.eu/defencefacts/showvalues.aspx?CountryID=EU&Year=2008 (accessed in 
September 2010). Larger armed forces are sustained by France with 250,000: 
http://www.webcitation.org/5kwpV2ULl (accessed in September 2010); Germany with 247,000: 
http://www.bundeswehr.de (accessed in September 2010);  the United Kingdom with 240,000: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_of_the_European_Union#cite_note-15 (accessed in September 
2010); Italy 187,000: http://www.difesa.it/NR/rdonlyres/5EF11493-59DD-4FB7-8485-
F4258D9F5891/0/Nota_Aggiuntiva_2009.pdf (accessed in September 2010); Greece with 177,000: 
http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Europe/Greece-ARMED-FORCES.html (accessed in  09/2010); 
and Spain with 143,000: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_of_the_European_Union#cite_note-15 
(accessed in September 2010). Smaller armed forces are sustained for example by Latvia with 5,500: 
http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Europe/Latvia-ARMED-FORCES.html (accessed in September 
2010); Malta with 2,140: http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Europe/Malta.html (accessed in 
09/2010) and Luxembourg with 900: http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Europe/Luxembourg-
ARMED-FORCES.html (accessed in September 2010) .  
32 1,385,122  in 2008 according to the US Library of Congress and the Central Intelligence Agency at: 
http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=United-States-of-
America (accessed in September 2010).  
33 T. Sandler and K. Hartley, K (1999). Political Economy of NATO (CUP, 1999) 
159-160. See also refers in this book to T Callaghan. 
K. Hartley, “Defence industrial policy in a military alliance”,  
(2006) 43 Journal of Peace Research 483-484. 
34 Ibid. 
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the troops, which covers almost 90 per cent of EU Member States’ defence spending. 
However, it does not require reliable data to assume that the savings on the combined 
national defence budgets would be considerable, well exceeding 17 per cent, 
especially if the overall troop size would be brought down from over 2 million to at 
least US American levels, if possible below that.   
The second is a 10 per cent figure. This is a conservative estimate of by what 
percentage the costs for the main pieces of armaments equipment grow each year. In 
other words the costs double about every 7 years. Considering the current costs of a 
fighter aircraft of about £100 million the reader might get a feel for the dimensions we 
are talking about. Several Member States cannot afford this equipment any more and 
buy smaller and smaller quantities to make up for the increased costs. The question is 
how much longer EU Member States will be able to afford 27 meaningful and 
separate armies. 
Therefore the financial subsidiarity argument for a European army is, that it would 
be cheaper in an environment of tight budgets, especially it times of financial crisis, 
and in a few years, a European army might well be the only meaningful army that all 
Member States pooling their resources, can afford at all. This argument also emanates 
from the United Kingdom 1998 Defence Strategic Review35 and the St-Malo 
Declaration: the necessary restructuring can only be financed on a common basis. We 
currently have very expensive and outdated 28 national Cold War armies we do not 
need. We need different forces, easily deployable and well equipped. These forces or 
force, as Anand Menon put it, “will not be cheap”.36 There are compelling financial 
arguments for a common force.  
 
 
4.2 The military considerations 
The small size of the European national armed forces makes them unsuited for large 
scale military operations. With regards to peacekeeping operations, even larger 
Member States such as the United Kingdom may still be able to intervene on a small 
scale in Sierra Leone, but need to cooperate with other countries in any mission on a 
medium or large scale, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Congo, or Macedonia. 
Larger operations such as Kosovo or Afghanistan cannot be conducted without the 
support of the USA at all.   
Moreover, the troops for joint peacekeeping operations are always put together 
on an ad hoc basis, often have to work together in that composition for the first time, 
do not know each other, use different equipment and procedures, can be withdrawn at 
any time, and generally lack cohesion: they are not one force but a combination of 
forces. Moreover, as the recent dispute over the EU peacekeeping mission in Chad 
has shown, Member States are often happy to support a mission with their vote in the 
Council, but are often slow to contribute troops, equipment and money to the 
implementation of the mission. The bottom line is that EU peacekeeping forces are 
militarily less effective than a permanent force would be. This principle learned from 
peacekeeping operations at the EU but also United Nations and NATO levels can be 
transferred to the territorial defence of the Member States. A permanent single 
European force would be more effective through greater cohesion.   
                                                
35 Reference to the recent review. 
36 Anand Menon, “Why ESDP is Misguided and Dangerous for the Alliance” in Jolyon Howorth and 
John T. S. Keeler (eds.), Defending Europe: The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy 
(Palgrave Macmillan: New York and Basingstoke, 2003) 203-217, at 204. 
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Moreover, the financial and military subsidiarity arguments can be combined: 
national armies will soon be too small to provide effective defence and security. 
 
 
4.3 The political implications 
There is and there always has been a clear connection between military power and the 
efficiency of a foreign policy. As former UN Secretary General Kofi Anan put it:  
 
“You can do a lot more with diplomacy backed by firmness and force.” 
 
The British Defence Strategic Review 1998 puts in the following terms:  
 
“Strong defence is the essential underpinning of a successful foreign policy.” 
 
A diplomat who is known to have a large army behind him or her will be listened to 
more than one without such a background. The diplomat representing the EU is 
known to have no army; he or she has a large economy, funds, and soft power behind 
him or her, but no army. Hence in the most security intensive situations his or her 
voice is often ignored. A cohesive, easily deployable, and well equipped EU military 
force would enhance the weight of the EU as an international actor considerably – 
through its existence alone. 
 
 
4.4 Conclusion on subsidiarity 
Hence the defence policies of the Member States are considerably more expensive 
than a common defence would be, the only way forward – accelerated by the current 
economic crisis and mounting public debt – is to downsize the armed forces even 
further. The separate 28 armies are mostly so small that they can only be effectively 
used in concert with others. However, in this context there are insufficient common 
structures, procedures, and experiences to work together effectively. As a result of the 
small size of these national armed forces, the Member States are not fully taken 
seriously by their partners, most noticeably the United States, or potential or actual 
adversaries. There are still a few exceptions, most noticeably the United Kingdom, 
but in the changing international power structure this exceptional status, if it even still 
exists, is likely to get lost. Hence the only way forward is either an even fuller 
reliance on the United States, which might loose interest in Europe, or a common 
defence policy including common military structures. The more comprehensive the 
integration of defence, in other words the closer to Model 1 “the European Defence 
Force”, the larger the financial, military-strategic, and political benefits.    
 
 
5. How to establish a European Army: flexibility 
When in comes to how a “European Army” could be established in legal terms, a 
significant obstacle needs to be addressed. Some Member States would be ready to 
establish a common military structure. These are France, Germany, Belgium, Spain, 
Portugal, Hungary, Slovakia, Estonia, and possibly the Netherlands and even the 
United Kingdom.37 However, some other Member States are not ready to transfer 
their sovereignty over their armed forces to the EU. They do not want to participate in 
                                                
37 Depending on the government of the day …. 
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a European army. Some Member States think they are not legally able to participate in 
a European army because of their status of neutrality. These are Finland, Sweden, 
Ireland, Austria, Cyprus, and Malta. Some Member States are not financially and 
militarily able to make a significant contribution to a European army. These could be 
mainly the small Member States. Some Member States, perhaps the United Kingdom 
being one of them, do not wish to participate, because they think they can go it alone 
or because they want to built their defence on a strong relationship with the United 
States only. The basic problem is that not all Member States would be participating in 
common European military structures.  
The classical principle of European integration has been the principle of 
uniformity. This means that all Member States reach a certain level of integration at 
the same time: the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty, the EEC Treaty, the 
Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Nice all entered into force and bound the 
Member States at the same time. The same happened with the Treaty of Lisbon which 
entered into force on the 1 December 2009. The principle of uniformity can be the 
principle of integration when the number of participating Member States is reasonably 
small and their policies comparable, as with the founding six Member States. It 
becomes increasingly unattainable in a Union of 27 or more Member States which we 
have today. Therefore EU law mechanisms where developed which essentially allow 
an avant-garde group of Member States - which is less than all Member States - to 
integrate a new policy area within the framework of the EU, including the institutional 
framework, without committing the other Member States that wish to stay outside the 
new policy. This integration happens with the blessing of the Member States staying 
outside who have the option to join the new policy later. These mechanisms are 
referred to as “flexibility”, “differentiation”, or “two speed Europe”, sometimes also 
as “Europe à la carte”. 
Examples for these mechanisms are European Monetary Policy, “the Euro” in 
which currently 19 Member States participate, and 9 Member States retain their own 
policies and currencies because there are not willing or not economically able to join. 
Another example is the “Schengen Acquis” of a European without border controls, 
which excludes the United Kingdom and Ireland. The current CSDP also has its 
distinct form of flexibility since Denmark does not participate in any polices 
involving military matters. 
Hence the thesis on the question of how a “European Army” could be 
introduced: it could be introduced as a flexible framework, allowing it to be 
established by an avant-garde group of Member States, without those Member States, 
who are unwilling, neutral, or economically unable to participate. Member States 
outside the policy could join later or stay outside on the permanent basis.   
The Treaty of Nice did not allow the existing flexibility framework called 
“enhanced cooperation” to be used for military matters, including common military 
structures. This was due to a specific exclusion in the Treaty, put there in 2000 on a 
British initiative,38 probably to prevent any structures without the participation of the 
United Kingdom. The Treaty of Lisbon no longer contains this military exemption 
and provides the military specific flexibility instrument of “permanent structured 
cooperation”. Article 42 (6) of the Lisbon version of the Treaty on European Union 
provides: 
 
                                                
38 Craig and de Búrca, EU Law (OUP, 3rd ed. 2003), at 46.  
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“Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and 
which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with 
a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured 
cooperation within the Union framework.” 
 
Article 1 (b) Protocol on Permanent Structured Cooperation (to the Treaty of Lisbon) 
provides: 
 
“The permanent structured cooperation […] shall be open to any Member 
State which undertakes, from the day of entry into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon, to: 
    
Have the capacity to supply by 2010 at the latest, either at national level or as 
a component of multinational force groups, targeted combat units for the 
missions planned, structured at a tactical level as a battle group, with support 
elements including transport and logistics, capable of carrying out the tasks 
referred to in [the TEU], within a period of 5 to 30 days, in particular in 
response to requests from the United Nations Organisation, and which can be 
sustained for an initial period of 30 days and be extended up to at least 120 
days.” 
 
This clearly subjects the future common military structures of the EU to flexibility in 
the form of permanent structured cooperation. It is submitted that this is the most 
significant innovation of the Treaty of Lisbon in the field of the European Security 
and Defence Policy, which under Lisbon will be called the Common Security and 
Defence Policy.39 
A possible if not likely scenario is that over the next decade several Member 
States, hopefully including the United Kingdom, will form battle groups until an 
overall size of 60,000-100,000 is reached. Moreover, once formed they will also be 
deployed. This will create the experience and tradition to move towards an even more 
permanent force in the future. A further development to a more permanent European 
Rapid Reaction Force or would not require a Treaty revision as the Treaty of Lisbon 





In an environment of changing security challenges, now including terrorism, regional 
conflicts at the periphery, and natural and man made disasters, in an environment of 
significant budget cuts which will not spare the armed forces the indefinite 
preservation of Europe’s redundant Cold War armies represents a frivolous luxury 
and puts our security at risk. The armed forces have to be subjected to a fundamental 
                                                
39 The Inaugural Lecture contained the following sentence: “In case you did not have the chance to 
listen to the news today. This morning the Czech Constitutional Court decided that the Treaty of 
Lisbon does not violate the Czech Constitution. The President of the Czech Republic had announced 
that in case of such a decision he will sign the Lisbon Treaty. Thus the last hurdle for the entering into 
force of the Treaty, probably on 1 December, has bee removed. From today it is certain that the Treaty 




reform, yes in parts have to be completely rebuilt. The legal, financial, military-
strategic, and political argument to conduct this reform on an EU basis was the core 
element of this article. Moreover, a possible and likely legal framework on how this 
could be done from an EU law perspective was also presented. Without a well 
equipped, cohesive, and deployable force, Europe will remain as powerless as it was 
during the massacre of Srebrenica, or when the killings began in Kosovo. The words 
of former Belgian Prime Minister Mark Eyskens, that “Europe is an economic giant, a 
political dwarf, and, even worse, a military worm until it concerns itself with 
elaborating a defence capability” will remain true. The political will to create these 
structures is not yet there- it is also for the general public to question the lack of 
reform in this area. The Common Security and Defence Policy and the development 
of a European force, is still uncertain and many questions remain unanswered. 
However, unanswered questions are a fertile ground for research - and the author 
intends to use the next decades to make a contribution in this respect. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
